NYT column re executive comp proposal
By: Cydney Posner
In today's New York Times there is an article that provides a small glimpse of some of the lobbying going on in connection with the SEC's executive compensation proposal. The column also raises a couple of interesting points. First, the column questions whether greater disclosure will actually lead to increased compensation, envy being a pretty powerful motivator. Second, the column, raises the issue of whether the currently proposed stock tables really provide any insight into the alignment of executive and shareholder interests, given the prevalence of derivative transactions in which executives keep ownership of shares but surrender much or all of the economic benefits and risks.
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