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# Comp Talks: The Latest re CD&A Disclosure

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# What Are We Talking About?

- Lessons from 2016 & outlook for 2017
- Hot topics
- Avoiding common pitfalls
- Addressing institutional investors' expectations and maximizing proxy advisory firm reactions
- Dodd-Frank Act SEC Rulemaking Update
- Other important (non-CD&A) compensation considerations for 2017 proxies

# Lessons from 2016 & Outlook for 2017


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# What Did We See in 2016?


- Similar say on pay statistics to previous years
  - ISS recommended “for” roughly 89% of proposals
  - Successful vote does not guarantee success in following year
- (Even) more engagement and related disclosure
- Pay for performance disconnect was principal driver of votes against SOP
- Weak say on pay can result in weak support for board members

# What Did We See in 2016?

## Results of All SOP Proposals




## Results of “Passed” SOP Proposals



# Results of 2016 Passed Say-on-Pay Proposals Following...


## Positive ISS Recommendation

95% average support



## Negative ISS Recommendation

72% average support



Data based on results from 1,972 meetings reported as of August 29, 2016; source: ISS Voting Analytics database

# What Do We Expect for 2017?

- Continued pay-for-performance focus
- Further design enhancements and highlights
- Continued increase in engagement and disclosure
- Focus on peer groups, incentives and performance goals
- Say on frequency votes

# Hot Topics

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# Pay for Performance

- Voluntary disclosure of how pay is linked to company performance
  - Equilar: 95.7% of S&P 500 companies included disclosure in 2016 (largest year over year change)
  - The “performance” measure varies, as does how “compensation” is reported
  - SEC proposed rules – disclosure may be required in the future (not for 2017 proxy season)

## *Practice Tips:*

- No one size fits all (despite proposed SEC rules)
- Don't let the tail wag the dog – beware of changes from year to year
- Avoid perception of “pay for failure” – address head on

# Pay for Performance – Disclosure Example

## Jack in the Box




<sup>(1)</sup> The graph above shows the cumulative return to holders of the Company's Common Stock at September 30<sup>th</sup> of each year assuming \$100 was invested on September 30, 2010, and assumes reinvestment of dividends. The Company paid dividends beginning in fiscal 2014.

# Jack in the Box – “At-Risk” Pay Disclosure

## Fiscal 2015 Targeted Total Direct Compensation Mix.

The chart below shows the percentage breakdown of targeted total direct compensation (“TDC”) (consisting of base salary, target annual incentive, and target long-term incentive) for each NEO in fiscal 2015. Consistent with our objective of pay for performance alignment (described in Section II of this CD&A), the largest portion of compensation is variable, at-risk pay in the form of annual and long-term incentives (including annual incentive, stock options and performance share units). In fiscal 2015, 61% of our CEO’s pay was at risk, and 52%-54% of pay for our other NEOs.




# Pay for Performance – ISS Policy Change

- ISS is incorporating *additional financial measures* to supplement its legacy (and continued) use of TSR when assessing the alignment of CEO pay with company performance
- The new metrics and weightings vary based on each company's GICS industry group
  - Metrics may include relative evaluations of return on equity, return on invested capital, revenue growth, EBITDA growth and free cash flow from operations growth
- The new financial performance assessment is **not** part of ISS' **quantitative** pay-for-performance screen in 2017, but it will be considered in the **qualitative** analysis and may mitigate or heighten concerns identified in the quantitative screens

# Alternative Pay Disclosure

- Company's opportunity to disclose "value" of what is paid
- Varying definitions of pay
  - Summary Comp Table pay
  - Realizable pay
  - Realized pay
  - Proposed SEC rules on "Compensation Actually Paid"
- Standardization versus flexibility

**Equilar: S&P 500 Realized Pay Disclosure**



*Practice tips:*

- Find the right measure that makes sense for you
- Explain the definitions used


# Design Enhancements

- CD&A table of contents / “quick reference guide”
- Proxy/CD&A summary
- Headers (bigger, brighter)
- Lists of positive practices (what we do, what we don't do)
- Reduce narrative, increase charts, graphs and bullets


Performance Measurement Framework with 2015 Pay Actions		
Base Salary		
Salary increases, which took effect in November 2014, ranged from 3.0% to 6.2% (averaging 4.2%), excluding Ms. Allen who joined the Company in October 2014 (fiscal 2015). Base salary increases were given to maintain market competitiveness, and to recognize individual performance, skills, experience, and criticality of the position to the Company.		
Annual Incentive		
BRAND SERVICES CEO, CFO, CLO	JACK IN THE BOX Brand President	QDOBA Brand President
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 70% Jack in the Box Inc. Operating Earnings Per Share (EPS)</li><li>• 30% Consolidated Restaurant Operating Margin (ROM)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 30% Jack in the Box Inc. Operating Earnings Per Share (EPS)</li><li>• 40% JIB Segment Operating Income</li><li>• 30% JIB Restaurant Operating Margin (ROM)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 30% Jack in the Box Inc. Operating Earnings Per Share (EPS)</li><li>• 40% Qdoba Segment Operating Income</li><li>• 30% Qdoba Restaurant Operating Margin (ROM)</li></ul>
2015 Results	2015 Results	2015 Results
Annual Incentives were paid at 1.92x target payout. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• EPS substantially exceeded the target goal, just below the maximum goal (1.91x target payout).</li><li>• Consolidated ROM was just below the maximum goal (1.93x target payout).</li></ul>	Annual Incentives were paid at 1.98x target payout. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• EPS substantially exceeded the target goal, just below the maximum goal (1.91x target payout).</li><li>• JIB Segment Operating Income exceeded the maximum goal (2.0x target payout).</li><li>• JIB ROM exceeded the maximum goal (2.0x target payout).</li></ul>	Annual Incentives were paid at 1.15x target payout. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• EPS substantially exceeded the target goal, just below the maximum goal (1.91x target payout).</li><li>• Qdoba Segment Operating Income met the target goal (1.0x target payout).</li><li>• Qdoba ROM was above threshold goal, but below target (0.56x target payout).</li></ul>
Long-Term Incentive		
<b>34% Stock Options</b> 33% vesting per year 7 year term	<b>33% Performance Share Units (PSUs)</b> Vesting based on performance goal achievement over three-fiscal year performance period	<b>33% Restricted Stock Units (RSUs)</b> 20% vesting per year, with minimum 50% holding requirement
	<b>ROIC Goal (50%)</b> Return on Invested Capital From Operations ("ROIC")	<b>Sales Goal (50%)</b> Consolidated Systemwide Sales (All Restaurants)

# Engagement

**Equilar: S&P 500 Shareholder Engagement Disclosure**



**Equilar: S&P 500 Proxy Advisor Engagement Disclosure**



*Practice tips for disclosure of engagement:*

- Acknowledge past results
- Include scope of outreach and outcome of efforts
- Summarize investors' common concerns and how addressed (or why not)
- Consider describing general engagement process (if applicable)

# Other Hot Topics

- Peer companies
- Short term incentive plan/bonus disclosure
- Performance metrics (rigor, disclosure, changes)
- Continued adoption of “risk mitigators” (stock ownership guidelines, holding periods, clawbacks)

## *Practice tips:*

- Think carefully about each of these topics and consider how your disclosure could be improved
- Explain your rationale
- Don't be reliant on past practice or lack of historical scrutiny
- Be mindful of possible future changes in practice



# Avoiding Common Pitfalls

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# What Can Go Wrong?

- Not starting early enough, not being organized
  - Review last year's CD&A, remember prior commitments
  - Ensure appropriate records and personnel are available
  - Prepare a timeline and allocation of responsibility
  - Much can be written ahead of time
- Failing to explain the “why”
- More is not better
  - Avoid layering onto prior disclosure year after year; consider more efficient disclosure
- Trying to fit into the box
  - Many companies use a similar “format” and/or feel constrained to use the same format every year; consider the right format for disclosing these pay decisions, which may differ from year to year

# Addressing Institutional Investors' Expectations and Maximizing Proxy Advisory Firm Reactions

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# Institutional Investors

- Understand what influences their votes and highlight/address head on
- Maximize proxy advisory firm reactions – understand their policies, proactively address anticipated issues, engage in the off season
- Beware of pet peeves – problematic practices, lack of transparency, boilerplate disclosure
- Consider proactive and reactive supplemental filings

# Institutional Investors – “Hot-Button” Compensation Issues

- Pay-for-performance misalignment
- Problematic pay practices (e.g., gross ups, single trigger CIC payments, stock option repricing without shareholder approval)
- Discretionary bonuses/adjustments to performance metrics
- Lack of disclosure of performance metrics
- Lack of responsiveness to a low say on pay in prior year
- Lack of performance-vesting awards
- Above-median benchmarking without justifiable link to above-median performance and/or against aspirational peer group

# Dodd-Frank Act SEC Rulemaking Update

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# SEC Rulemaking – Dodd-Frank Act

## Impact on CD&A

- Say on pay & frequency of say on pay (adopted/effective)
- Say on parachutes (adopted/effective)
- Compensation committee independence (adopted/effective)
- Compensation committee consultants/advisors (adopted/effective)
- **Pay ratio (adopted/effective for most 2018 proxies covering 2017 compensation)**
- **Pay versus performance (proposed rules; comment period closed)**
- **Clawback policy (proposed rules; comment period closed)**

# Pay Ratio


- Requires disclosure of:
  - the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the company, except the CEO (that is, the point at which half the employees earn more and half earn less);
  - the annual total compensation of the CEO; and
  - the ratio of the two amounts above
- SEC adopted final rules August 5, 2015
- Disclosure not required in 2017 proxy statement
- Must disclose pay ratio for 2017 in 2018 proxy statement



# Pay Ratio

- Few companies voluntarily disclosed CEO pay ratios in 2016 (one S&P 500 company)
- Equilar: in 2016, 30%+ of S&P 500 companies disclosed that they considered internal pay equity when designing pay packages

## Equilar: S&P 500 Internal Pay Equity Disclosure



# Pay Versus Performance

- Requires disclosure of the relationship between “compensation actually paid” and “company financial performance”
- “Compensation actually paid” relies on the measure of total compensation in the SCT, but with two adjustments to the amounts included for pension benefits and equity awards (shown for CEO and as an average for other NEOs)
- “Company financial performance” is TSR (new table must also show peer group TSR)
- SEC proposed rules April 2015
- Comment period closed July 2015
- Not required for 2017 proxy season

# Clawback Policies

- The policy must provide that the company will recover from:
  - any current or former executive officer
  - an amount of incentive-based compensation
  - equal to the excess, if any, of the amount that was paid to the executive officer, in the three years preceding the date on which the company was required to prepare the restatement, over the amount that would have been paid to the executive officer based on the accurate financial data
- SEC proposed rules July 2015
- Comment period closed September 2015
- Not required for 2017 proxy season

# Other Important Compensation Items for 2017 Proxies

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# Other Important (Non-CD&A) Compensation Considerations for 2017 Proxy

- Director Compensation
  - Evaluation and disclosure of compensation practices
  - Litigation and “reasonable” limits on cash and equity compensation
- Equity Plan Proposals
  - Changes in ISS policy for general equity plan proposals, 162(m) proposals and director plan proposals
  - Expectation to go beyond the SEC requirements for proxy proposal disclosure